User Tools

From the full “Bayanihan” federal constitution draft on July 9, 2018 ([abs-cbn.com][1]). Let’s evaluate its internal consistency by focusing on key structural elements and potential points of conflict:

### ⚖️ 1. Separation of Powers & Power Concentration

* Concentrated executive power: The Draft allows the President to “assume all governmental powers—executive, legislative, and judicial—to prevent the breakup” of the federation ([en.wikipedia.org][2]).

  • This provision inherently conflicts with the principle of separation of powers. A constitution cannot simultaneously vest checks and balances and also permit their suspension. This likely undermines judicial independence and legislative oversight.

### 🗳️ 2. Transition Rules & Term Extensions

* Re‑election permission for incumbent President and VP: Under the Draft, current officeholders (President Duterte and VP Robredo) may run for two additional consecutive terms—potentially extending power for another eight years ([en.wikipedia.org][2]).

  • But the rules for new federated states and staggered elections could contradict this allowance. If interim governance is not uniformly synchronized across regions, term extension provisions could create political confusion or unequal start-points.

### 🏛️ 3. Vice Presidency, Succession & Institutional Roles

* Reports indicate the proposed charter omits the position of Vice President entirely ([en.wikipedia.org][3]).

  • However, it still references executive succession and related offices. Removing the second-highest executive without adjusting the succession structure creates a gap. Who assumes the presidency if the incumbent is incapacitated? Are the Speaker or Attorney-General next? These inconsistencies can fracture legitimacy in crisis.

### 👥 4. Checks on Political Dynasties & Party Hopping

* The draft nominally bans turncoatism (party‑hopping during specified periods) and prohibits dynastic candidacies within the second degree of relation ([en.wikipedia.org][4]).

  • Yet other sections reportedly omit or weaken these clauses, weakening enforcement. The lack of clarity on whether these apply to both national and regional offices—and whether they're self-implementing or reliant on enabling legislation—undermines their legal force.

### 🏙️ 5. Federal Structure & Territorial Arrangements

* The draft envisions 18 federal units (17 regions + Metro Manila) ([en.wikipedia.org][2]).

  • Without detailed provisions on regional autonomy, inter-governmental resource sharing, or mechanisms for formation, merger, or secession of units, conflicts may arise. For instance, if regions claim overlapping natural resources (like mineral rights or river systems), the absence of arbitration mechanisms is a structural oversight.

### ⚠️ 6. Redundancies & Ambiguities

* Constitutional experts note the draft contains redundant provisions, especially overlapping sections on powers, rights, and institutional mandates .

  • Redundancy can signal lack of cross-checking or even generate contradictions if later provisions are interpreted as modifying earlier ones.

### 🧩 Summary of Key Inconsistencies

Issue Conflict or Uncertainty
———————————- ——————————————————————————————
Executive power concentration Direct conflict with checks & balances—allows suspension of legislative and judicial power
Vice presidency removal Creates succession vacuum and institutional instability
Incumbent re-election Frozen institutional schedules may clash with staggered federal transition timelines
Anti-dynasty/turncoat stipulations Weak drafting and unclear scope undermine legal clarity
Federal unit autonomy Missing frameworks for disputes and resource allocation among regions
Redundancies Drafting overlaps invite judicial confusion and potential repeal conflicts

### 🔍 Conclusion

From a consistency standpoint, the Draft confronts serious internal friction:

1. Centralized executive authority invalidates the foundation of a federal system built on power-sharing. 2. Removal of the Vice President without succession protocols cuts a constitutional lifeline. 3. Staggered transition timelines clash with retroactive re‑election authorizations. 4. Weak enforcement of dynastic and party rules could render symbolic reforms toothless. 5. Absent dispute-resolution mechanisms for federal units leaves fragmentation ungoverned.

If you’d like, I can delve deeper by reviewing specific articles or sections. You might copy relevant snippets—like the article on “President’s Powers,” or sections on succession, liability, elections, and regional rights—and I’ll map how they align or conflict.

[1]: https://www.abs-cbn.com/focus/07/09/18/read-con-coms-final-draft-of-ph-federal-constitution?utm_source=chatgpt.com “READ: Con-Com's final draft of PH federal constitution - ABS-CBN” [2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federalism_and_Rodrigo_Duterte?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Federalism and Rodrigo Duterte” [3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federalism_in_the_Philippines?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Federalism in the Philippines” [4]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_reform_in_the_Philippines?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Constitutional reform in the Philippines”

This website uses cookies. By using the website, you agree with storing cookies on your computer. Also, you acknowledge that you have read and understand our Privacy Policy. If you do not agree, please leave the website.

More information